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Abstract 
The nature of the consequences of knowledge hiding, defined as an intentional attempt to 
withhold knowledge that has been requested, and the mechanisms through which knowledge 
hiding affects outcomes are under-theorized. In this research, we propose that knowledge hiding 
can evoke guilt and shame in the knowledge hiding perpetrator. We zoom into the three types of 
knowledge hiding—evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding—and predict that the 
more deceptive knowledge hiding types, namely evasive hiding and playing dumb, evoke 
stronger feelings of guilt and shame than rationalized hiding. We further argue that guilt and 
shame trigger differential emotion-based reparatory mechanisms, such that guilt induces the 
motivation to correct one’s transgressions through organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), 
whereas shame induces the tendency to withdraw after hiding knowledge, as reflected in lower 
levels of OCB. We test the proposed positive indirect relation between knowledge hiding and 
OCB via guilt, and the proposed negative indirect relation via shame in a scenario-based 
experiment and a two-wave field study. The studies provided support for most of our hypotheses. 
We discuss how the proposed emotion pathway can facilitate nuanced theorizing about 
consequences of knowledge hiding for different types of negative emotions and subsequent 
compensatory work behaviors.  
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Practitioner Points 
(1) Hiding knowledge from colleagues can lead to experiences of guilt and shame. Playing 
dumb (in contrast to evasive hiding and rationalized hiding) in particular elicits these 
negative emotional experiences. Practitioners should therefore aim to prevent knowledge 
hiding, and especially playing dumb, in organizations. 
(2) Guilt and shame elicit differential action tendencies in knowledge hiding perpetrators, 
which entails that negative emotions as a result of playing dumb can sometimes lead to 
positive behavioral consequences. 
(3) To effectively manage the consequences of knowledge hiding, practitioners should try to 
elicit constructive negative emotions (guilt) rather than destructive emotions (shame) as a 
reaction to employees’ knowledge hiding. This can facilitate employees’ compensation 
for their transgressions through organizational citizenship behavior, rather than 
withdrawal from the situation.    
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Consequences of Knowledge Hiding:  
The Differential Compensatory Effects of Guilt and Shame 
 
Hiding knowledge that has been requested by a colleague can have severe negative 
organizational consequences (Connelly & Zweig, 2015). Employees who hide their knowledge 
(i.e., the information, ideas, and expertise that are relevant for their task fulfillment at work; 
Bartol & Srivastava, 2002) by engaging in evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding, 
deprive other organizational members of the opportunity to learn and co-create new knowledge. 
As a consequence, the organizational capability to develop company-specific expertise might be 
diminished because organizations can only generate benefits from individually-held knowledge 
when employees make their knowledge available to others within the organization (Burmeister, 
Fasbender, & Deller, 2018; Serenko & Bontis, 2016; Webster et al., 2008).  
Researchers have begun to document the negative consequences of knowledge hiding. On 
the one hand, knowledge hiding perpetrators (i.e., employees who hide their knowledge) can 
harm their own effectiveness. For example, the creativity of knowledge hiding perpetrators can 
suffer because they get excluded from other employees’ knowledge flows and cannot benefit 
from the divergent perspectives of coworkers for their own idea generation and refinement 
(Bogilović, Černe, & Škerlavaj, 2017; Černe, Nerstad, Dysvik, & Škerlavaj, 2014; Rhee & Choi, 
2017). On the other hand, knowledge hiding targets (i.e., employees from whom knowledge is 
withheld) can experience reduced relationship quality and negative emotions because they feel 
rejected by knowledge hiding perpetrators (Connelly & Zweig, 2015). These negative emotional 
experiences seem to be most severe when knowledge hiding perpetrators engage in evasive 
hiding (e.g., offering incorrect, misleading, or incomplete information) as the most deceptive 
form of knowledge hiding, while the negative emotions are reduced for playing dumb (e.g., 
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pretending to be unaware of the requested information), and might even be absent for rationalized 
hiding (e.g., providing a justification for why the knowledge is not made accessible) because the 
rejection can be attributed to situational factors (Connelly & Zweig, 2015). 
Despite the important insights gained by previous research into consequences of 
knowledge hiding, the current literature is limited in three ways. First, whereas initial evidence 
has pointed to the negative emotional experiences of knowledge hiding targets (Connelly 
& Zweig, 2015), we have yet to understand the emotional consequences of knowledge hiding for 
knowledge hiding perpetrators. This perspective is important because knowledge hiding can be 
conceptualized as a possible transgression of accepted social norms within organizations where 
knowledge sharing is expected from employees (Bock, Zmud, Kim, & Lee, 2005). Second, while 
potential differences between evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding have been 
emphasized from the very beginning of research on knowledge hiding (Connelly, Zweig, 
Webster, & Trougakos, 2012), to date, only one study has provided evidence that meaningful 
differences between the three types of knowledge hiding exist (Connelly & Zweig, 2015). 
Following up on these initial findings seems a worthwhile endeavor to advance and differentiate 
our understanding of the knowledge hiding construct. Third, knowledge hiding and negative 
emotional experiences have been addressed in an over-simplified way, thereby overlooking the 
differential action tendencies triggered by negative emotions such as guilt and shame (Haidt, 
2003). For example, experienced guilt may facilitate compensation through organizational 
citizenship behavior (Ilies, Peng, Savani, & Dimotakis, 2013), while experienced shame may 
have detrimental effects on interactions with others through withdrawal from the shame-inducing 
situation (Bagozzi, Verbeke, & Gavino, 2003). This perspective is highly relevant because it 
suggests that knowledge hiding may not always be detrimental due to the differential action 
tendencies resulting from different negative emotions.   
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Consequently, to advance the literature on knowledge hiding, we propose a theoretical 
model in which knowledge hiding elicits guilt and shame in knowledge hiding perpetrators 
because they are likely to perceive their withholding of knowledge as a transgression of accepted 
social norms within organizations (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). Importantly, our model 
reflects possible differences between evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding 
because we consider their varying degree of deceptiveness. We further argue that the negative 
emotions of guilt and shame subsequently influence the extent to which knowledge hiding 
perpetrators engage in organizational citizenship behavior (OCB-I; extra-role behavior that 
benefits other employees but is not directly rewarded by the organization; Williams & Anderson, 
1991) to compensate for their perceived transgressions of social norms. Taken together, and in 
line with the idea of an emotion-based reparatory mechanism (Ilies et al., 2013), we propose that 
knowledge hiding (particularly evasive hiding and playing dumb) has a positive indirect effect on 
OCB-I through guilt, but a negative indirect effect on OCB-I through shame.  
In proposing this model, we aim to make three contributions to the literature on 
knowledge hiding. First, we add an emotion pathway to the existing research on consequences of 
knowledge hiding for the knowledge hiding perpetrator, to understand the link between 
knowledge hiding and positive work behavior (i.e., OCB-I). More specifically, we integrate 
research on knowledge hiding (Černe et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2012; Connelly & Zweig, 
2015) with the literature on self-conscious moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007) to theorize and test how knowledge hiding, negative moral emotions, and OCB-I 
are related through an emotion-based reparatory mechanism (Ilies et al., 2013). Second, we add 
to a fine-grained understanding of the knowledge hiding construct by considering the varying 
degree of deceptiveness of the three knowledge hiding types evasive hiding, playing dumb, and 
rationalized hiding to conceptualize their differential relations with guilt and shame and 
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subsequent positive work behavior. Third, we contribute to a more nuanced perspective on the 
proposed emotion-based reparatory mechanism (Ilies et al., 2013) by taking into account the 
different action tendencies of two central self-conscious moral emotions, namely guilt and shame.  
Knowledge Hiding and Self-Conscious Moral Emotions 
Knowledge hiding, defined as “an intentional attempt by an individual to withhold or 
conceal knowledge that has been requested by another person” (Connelly et al., 2012, p. 65), 
represents a predominantly negative work behavior that can involve elements of lying and 
deception (Connelly & Zweig, 2015). Importantly, knowledge hiding does not simply represent 
the absence of knowledge sharing because knowledge hiding perpetrators intentionally withhold 
knowledge. On the contrary, employees who fail to share knowledge might be unaware that their 
colleagues are seeking knowledge or they might simply not know the requested information 
(Connelly et al., 2012). Furthermore, knowledge hiding constitutes a reactive behavior (i.e., it is a 
reaction to a knowledge request), whereas knowledge sharing can also occur proactively (i.e., it 
does not necessarily involve a knowledge request). This entails that in some situations (but not in 
all) knowledge sharing may have some overlap with not hiding knowledge. For example, if 
someone is asked for knowledge, the only behavioral options are (1) providing (i.e., sharing) or 
(2) not providing (i.e., hiding) it. In contrast, in other situations, employees may realize that their 
knowledge can be useful for a colleague and share it without an active request from the other; in 
such a situation, there is no potential for knowledge hiding.  
Knowledge hiding bears conceptual similarities with other negative work behaviors, such 
as counterproductive work behavior (CWB), but represents a distinct and unique construct 
(Connelly et al., 2012; Serenko & Bontis, 2016). Specifically, knowledge hiding is different from 
CWB because it can only be directed at individuals not organizations and because knowledge 
hiding, in contrast to CWB, is not necessarily intended to do harm others, as individuals may hide 
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knowledge to protect themselves, others, or classified information (Connelly et al., 2012). 
Moreover, knowledge hiding is also different from employee silence (i.e., the intentional 
withholding of work-related information by employees from their workgroup; Tangirala & 
Ramanujam, 2008) because knowledge hiding refers to an employee’s decision to not provide 
knowledge when s/he is approached by someone else with a knowledge request. In contrast, 
employee silence lacks this component of being asked by someone and refers to a more general 
decision to not speak up proactively when one has a suggestion, concern, or a divergent point of 
view that could be useful to share (Morrison, 2014; van Dyne, Ang, & Botero, 2003).  
 Guilt and shame are conceptualized as self-conscious moral emotions (Haidt, 2003). The 
attribute self-conscious refers to self-evaluative and self-reflective processes and distinguishes 
shame and guilt from non-self-conscious or basic emotions, such as anger and fear (Tracy & 
Robins, 2006). To experience self-conscious emotions, individuals need to reflect on the 
emotion-eliciting event, and attribute their transgressions internally (Spector & Fox, 2010). 
Furthermore, guilt and shame are defined as moral because they represent emotional responses to 
events that are linked to the welfare of others (Haidt, 2003), and because they are triggered by 
behavior that is inconsistent with social norms or moral standards (Tangney et al., 2007). 
Although guilt and shame both represent self-conscious moral emotions, they differ from 
each other in important ways. Guilt can be defined as “an agitation-based emotion or painful 
feeling of regret that is aroused when the actor actually causes, anticipates causing, or is 
associated with an aversive event”, while shame refers to “a dejection-based, passive, or helpless 
emotion aroused by self-related aversive events” (Ferguson & Stegge, 1998, p. 20). The central 
difference between the two constructs is that individuals tend to experience guilt when they 
attribute transgression to their negative actions. In contrast, individuals tend to experience shame 
when they blame themselves rather than their actions (Lewis, 1993, 2000; Spector & Fox, 2010; 
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Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2006). Thus, guilt is caused by the perception that one’s 
behavior is defective, while shame is caused by the experience that something is wrong with 
oneself. 
 In this study, we argue that when employees hide their knowledge, they likely perceive 
their behavior as being in conflict with social norms (i.e., what most people do and what most 
people approve of and find acceptable in a given context; Cialdini et al., 1991). Normative beliefs 
on knowledge sharing are based on the perception that relevant others within the organization (e.g., 
supervisors or colleagues) expect one to openly share knowledge with other organizational 
members (Bock et al., 2005). This knowledge sharing norm has gained importance in the 
contemporary workplace where knowledge has become one of the most valuable resources 
(Goldman & Scardamalia, 2013), and work is increasingly characterized by high interdependence 
(Frazier & Tupper, 2016; Mathieu, Hollenbeck, Van Knippenberg, & Ilgen, 2017). Therefore, 
employees are required to share information and knowledge openly to achieve collective goals and 
contribute to organizational success (Kim & Ployhart, 2014; Parke, Campbell, & Bartol, 2014; 
Wang, Noe, & Wang, 2011), which makes knowledge hiding appear as a violation of social norms.  
We propose that knowledge hiding can induce feelings of guilt and shame in the 
knowledge hiding perpetrators. In general, individuals may perceive guilt and shame as a 
consequence of different types of social norm transgressions. For example, feelings of guilt and 
shame can be elicited when dressing inappropriately in a given context (Syed, 2008) or drinking 
too much alcohol at a social gathering (Giguère, Lalonde, & Taylor, 2014). In the work context, 
researchers have argued that norm violations lead to increased feelings of guilt and shame when 
employees perceive their own behavior as not in line with organizational expectations (O'Boyle, 
Forsyth, & O'Boyle, 2011). In a qualitative study on adherence to workplace policies (Harding, 
Carpenter, Finelli, & Passow, 2004), feelings of guilt and shame were the most frequent 
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responses to anticipated violations of commonly accepted norms within the profession. 
Furthermore, Ilies et al. (2013) demonstrated that employees who engaged in counterproductive 
work behavior experienced increased guilt because they engaged in actions that were disapproved 
in the organization. As knowledge hiding is often studied as an overarching construct (Webster et 
al., 2008), we first seek to clarify its overall association with self-conscious moral emotions by 
hypothesizing:  
 Hypothesis 1. Knowledge hiding is positively associated with (a) guilt and (b) shame. 
Furthermore, the three types of knowledge hiding differ in their degree of deception (i.e., 
the degree to which employees knowingly provide misleading information that leads to false 
conclusions by others; Connelly et al., 2012) and thus may have differential effects on negative 
moral emotions. Evasive hiding is considered to be the most deceptive way to hide knowledge, 
followed by playing dumb, and rationalized hiding, whose deceptive nature has been questioned 
because employees may engage in rationalized hiding to protect others or proprietary information 
(Connelly et al., 2012; Connelly & Zweig, 2015). Hence, we also propose differential hypotheses 
depending on the degree of deception associated with the three knowledge hiding types to further 
advance our understanding about possible differences among evasive hiding, playing dumb, and 
rationalized hiding in their relationship with negative emotional experiences (Connelly & Zweig, 
2015).  
In support of the idea that the different types of knowledge hiding might have unique 
effects, Connelly et al. (2012) identified different contextual and interpersonal predictors of the 
three knowledge hiding types. Furthermore, Connelly and Zweig (2015) found that evasive 
hiding and playing dumb, but not rationalized hiding hurt the relationships with knowledge 
hiding targets. The authors argued that evasive hiding and playing dumb, as deceptive forms of 
knowledge hiding, make it more difficult for knowledge hiding perpetrators to justify their 
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actions, while rationalized hiding might even lead to recognition from others as dutiful 
employees who aim to fulfill their responsibilities (Connelly & Zweig, 2015).  
Building on these differences among knowledge hiding types, we expect that evasive hiding 
and playing dumb, but not rationalized hiding elicit feelings of guilt and shame in knowledge 
hiding perpetrators because their deceptive nature makes the rationalization as a pro-social rather 
than self-interested act more difficult (Webster et al., 2008). In line with our argument, research has 
shown that the act of deception, which has been associated with evasive hiding and playing dumb, 
can elicit feelings of guilt and shame (Seiter & Bruschke, 2007). Thus, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2. Evasive hiding is positively associated with (a) guilt and (b) shame.  
Hypothesis 3. Playing dumb is positively associated with (a) guilt and (b) shame. 
Hypothesis 4. Rationalized hiding is not associated with (a) guilt and (b) shame. 
The Differential Effects of Guilt and Shame on OCB-I 
Drawing from theorizing in the moral emotions literature (Haidt, 2003; Tangney, 1991; 
Tangney et al., 2007), we assume that the behavioral consequences of guilt and shame are 
different. Specifically, we suggest that the different action tendencies evoked by feelings of guilt 
and shame determine whether or not employees compensate for their violation of social norms by 
engaging in OCBs. OCBs describe altruistic, voluntary activities that organizational members 
undertake without compensation (Organ, 1988; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2016). 
When these activities are directed at other organizational members, they are referred to as OCB-
individual (OCB-I). Employees who engage in OCB-I will, for example, assist their colleagues 
when they need help, make time to listen to them, and take a personal interest in their wellbeing. 
Since OCB-I can be considered morally appropriate workplace behavior and often constitutes a 
behavioral expression of employees’ current emotional states (Lee & Allen, 2002), it may be 
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closely linked to employees’ emotion-based experiences following morally inappropriate 
behavior, such as certain types of knowledge hiding.  
 Guilt motivates perpetrators to help their victim, compensate for their transgressions, and 
engage in reparative actions (Haidt, 2003; Ilies et al., 2013; Lewis, 1993; Tangney et al., 2007). 
This behavior is motivated by the need to restore or improve one’s interpersonal relationships 
(Haidt, 2003). Empirical research has provided some evidence for the assumption that guilt can 
elicit positive compensatory behavior. For example, guilt has been positively associated with 
other-oriented empathic responsiveness (Tangney, 1991). Furthermore, uncooperative behavior 
(e.g., refusing to fulfill a request) can result in increased feelings of guilt, which in turn increases 
the likelihood to compensate by displaying higher levels of cooperative behavior in subsequent 
social interactions (Ketelaar & Tung Au, 2003; O'Keefe & Figge, 1997). Lastly, Ilies et al. (2013) 
found that employees who experience guilt because they engaged in counterproductive work 
behavior indicated higher OCB intentions and subsequently showed more OCB. Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 5. Guilt is positively associated with OCB-I. 
 Shame corresponds with the tendency to hide, deny, and withdraw from the shame-
inducing situation, rather than making up for one’s transgressions (Haidt, 2003; Lewis, 1993; 
Tangney et al., 2007). While such withdrawing behavior signals that perpetrators are well aware 
of the violation of social norms, it also reflects their aim to reduce the probability of being 
attacked or punished by others for their wrongdoing (Haidt, 2003). Rather than engaging in other-
oriented reparative actions, shamed individuals typically respond with self-oriented actions, such 
as avoiding others (Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006). For example, shame has been shown to 
decrease other-oriented empathic responsiveness and increase self-directed personal distress 
(Tangney, 1991). In addition, Dutch salespeople who experienced shame were less likely to 
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engage in positive relational behavior, such as relationship building (Bagozzi et al., 2003). 
Further illustrating the passive behavioral component of shame, Ghorbani, Liao, Çayköylü, and 
Chand (2013) demonstrated that shame (in contrast to guilt) did not lead to compensatory 
behavior toward in-group members in an ethical decision-making scenario. Thus, we assume that 
shame is negatively related to the knowledge hiding perpetrator’s tendency to perform OCB-I: 
Hypothesis 6. Shame is negatively associated with OCB-I. 
The Differential Effects of the Knowledge Hiding Types on OCB-I through Guilt and Shame 
 Bringing together our arguments, we propose that evasive hiding and playing dumb as the 
two more deceptive types of knowledge hiding, show positive relations with OCB-I through guilt 
but negative relations with OCB-I through shame. In contrast, we predict that the same indirect 
relations cannot be observed for rationalized hiding. 
With regard to the relations between knowledge hiding types and guilt and shame, the two 
deceptive types of knowledge hiding (i.e., evasive hiding and playing dumb) should make it more 
difficult for knowledge hiding perpetrators to rationalize and justify their actions as not violating 
accepted social norms (Connelly et al., 2012; Connelly & Zweig, 2015; Webster et al., 2008). In 
particular, evasive hiding and playing dumb are deceptive as perpetrators know better but still 
engage in knowledge hiding because they put their own interests first (e.g., saving time and 
effort, keeping requested knowledge to themselves to retain competitive advantage). Given that 
deceptive acts can elicit guilt and shame (Seiter & Bruschke, 2007), evasive hiding and playing 
dumb are likely to elicit guilt and shame, too. In contrast, rationalized hiding must not be 
deceptive as perpetrators may hide knowledge to, for example, protect classified information or 
the welfare of others within the organization. As such, employees who engage in rationalized 
hiding might not experience guilt and shame (Connelly & Zweig, 2015), because they perceive 
their actions as being in alignment with social norms.  
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With regard to the relations between guilt and shame and OCB-I, we argue that guilt 
triggers an emotion-based reparatory mechanism resulting in higher amounts of OCB-I (Ilies et 
al., 2013), whereas shame triggers a self-reinforcing cycle of withdrawal resulting in lower levels 
of OCB-I. These differential action tendencies, i.e., compensatory actions vs. withdrawal, 
originate from the different nature of these two self-conscious moral emotions (Lewis, 1993, 
2000; Spector & Fox, 2010; Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 2006). As guilt is caused by 
the perception that one’s behavior is defective, which is likely to be perceived as changeable, 
employees might be more likely to be motivated to remedy the potential harm caused by their 
behavior by engaging in OCB-I. In contrast, shame is caused by the perception that something is 
wrong with one’s self, which is more likely to increase one’s helplessness, resulting in passive 
withdrawal rather than active compensation. Consequently, guilt and shame have differential 
effects on OBC-I based on the opposing action tendencies that these emotions evoke. Hence, we 
posit that evasive hiding and playing dumb are positively related to OCB-I through guilt and 
negatively related to OCB-I through shame, while the same effects cannot be observed for 
rationalized hiding. 
Hypothesis 7. Evasive hiding is (a) positively and indirectly associated with OCB-I 
through guilt, but (b) negatively and indirectly associated with OCB-I through shame.  
Hypothesis 8. Playing dumb is (a) positively and indirectly associated with OCB-I 
through guilt, but (b) negatively and indirectly associated with OCB-I through shame.  
Hypothesis 9. Rationalized hiding is not indirectly associated with OCB-I through (a) 
guilt and (b) shame.  
Figure 1 presents our conceptual model. 
***Please insert Figure 1 about here*** 
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Study 1: Scenario-Based Experiment 
In Study 1, we used an experimental vignette methodology (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014) in 
which participants responded to a hypothetical scenario to probe whether priming of overall 
knowledge hiding behavior could elicit the two self-conscious moral emotions guilt and shame. 
Sample 
We obtained a sample of N = 156 U.S. American employees using the platform Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Samples generated via Mechanical Turk have been shown to yield similar 
results when compared to other convenience samples generated for organizational research 
(Landers & Behrend, 2015). Participants received $1.25 for their participation. Only individuals 
who were full-time employed (>35 hours/week) were eligible to participate in the study. To 
ensure the quality of the data, two quality screen-outs were implemented. Of the initial sample, 
19 participants who failed to respond correctly to the quality screen-outs were removed. This 
resulted in a final sample of 137 participants. On average, participants were 36.97 years old (SD 
= 10.02), and 51.8 percent were female. The majority of the participants had a bachelor or master 
degree (66.4%), and worked in white-collar jobs (80.3%). Participants were employed in a wide 
range of industries: information technology (21.2%), public sector (15.3%), health care (13.1%), 
finance (8.0%), food (6.6%), construction (2.9%), automotive (1.5%), energy (1.5%), chemical 
(1.5%), textiles (0.7%), or other industries (27.7%). 
Procedure 
We used an experimental vignette methodology (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014) in which 
participants responded to hypothetical scenarios to manipulate knowledge hiding. We employed 
this methodology for three reasons: First, vignettes have been shown to effectively manipulate 
norm violations (Belschak & Den Hartog, 2009; Ghorbani et al., 2013; Raghunathan & Pham, 
1999), and induce emotions in a work context (Belschak & Den Hartog, 2009; Ghorbani et al., 
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2013; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999). Second, research has shown that direct manipulations and 
scenario-based methods produce comparable results (Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 
2005). Third, we used hypothetical vignettes in which participants were asked to envision being 
the employee described in the scenario rather than a situation-recall writing-induced task where 
participants reported on their actual knowledge hiding behavior in the past because hypothetical 
scenarios tend to be more effective in eliciting emotional responses than situation-recall 
inductions (Steiner, 2009). 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the knowledge hiding or the no knowledge 
hiding condition. In both conditions, participants read the following scenario:  
“Please imagine being a member of a large company and working a very important project 
that will affect the future success of the company and is also important for your career. You 
and your colleague are working together towards meeting the final project deadline. Each 
of you holds different information relevant for the successful completion of the task. You 
are sitting at your desk and preparing your part of the project report. In that moment, your 
colleague approaches your desk and asks whether you could share your specialized 
knowledge on business reporting with him, as your colleague has trouble generating the 
correct numbers for the project report.”  
 The participants in the knowledge hiding condition then read the following manipulation: 
“You realize that you possess the requested knowledge, but you decide to withhold that 
knowledge form your colleague. How would hiding knowledge from your colleague make you 
feel in that situation?” In contrast, the participants in the no knowledge hiding condition read: 
“You realize that you possess the requested knowledge, and you decide to openly provide your 
knowledge to your colleague. How would providing your knowledge to your colleague make you 
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feel in that situation?” After reading the vignettes, participants provided data on experienced guilt 
and shame, and knowledge hiding for the manipulation check.  
Measures 
Guilt. Guilt was measured with four items derived from the Harder Personal Feelings 
Questionnaire (PFQ2; Harder & Lewis, 1987). Participants indicated the extent to which they felt 
“mild guilt”, “worry about hurting or injuring someone”, “intense guilt”, and “regret” 
(Cronbach’s α = .93). Participants assessed the four items on a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much).  
Shame. Shame was measured with four items derived from the Harder Personal Feelings 
Questionnaire (PFQ2; Harder & Lewis, 1987). Participants indicated the extent to which they 
experienced “being embarrassed”, “feeling ridiculous”, “self-consciousness”, and “feelings of 
blushing” (Cronbach’s α = .88). Participants assessed the four items on a seven-point scale 
ranging from 1 (very little) to 7 (very much).  
Results 
Manipulation check. Prior to testing Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we performed a manipulation 
check for knowledge hiding as a between-subject factor. Participants were asked: “To which 
extent did you hide knowledge from your coworker in the described situation?” using a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (a very great extent). The results of an independent t-
test revealed a significant difference between the control (M = 1.56, SD = 1.20) and the 
knowledge hiding (M = 6.32, SD = 1.07) conditions (t(137)= -24.37, p < .01); thus, supporting 
the successful manipulation of knowledge hiding.  
Hypotheses testing. Table 1 shows means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
variables in Study 1.  
***Please insert Table 1 about here*** 
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b addressed the positive effects of knowledge hiding on guilt and 
shame. The multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed significant differences 
between the two knowledge hiding conditions with guilt and shame as the dependent measures 
(F(2,134) = 83.33, p < .01, partial η² = .55). Furthermore, Bonferroni adjusted univariate tests 
showed a significant difference between the two knowledge hiding conditions with regards to 
guilt (F(1, 135)= 167.62, p < .01, partial η² = .55) and shame (F(1, 135)= 59.29, p < .01, partial 
η² = .31), suggesting that participants in the knowledge hiding group reported significantly higher 
levels of guilt (M = 4.39, SD = 1.59) and shame (M = 3.23, SD = 1.62) than those in the no 
knowledge hiding group (Mguilt = 1.52, SDguilt = 0.95; Mshame = 1.50, SDshame = 0.93). Taken 
together, these results support Hypotheses 1a and 1b and indicate that hiding knowledge can elicit 
the self-conscious moral emotions guilt and shame.  
Study 2: Field Study 
In Study 2, we aimed to extend the findings from Study 1 by testing the differential 
associations of the three knowledge hiding types with guilt and shame (Hypotheses 2 to 4). 
Moreover, we aimed to test the proposed relations of guilt and shame and OCB-I (Hypotheses 5 
and 6), and the indirect relations among evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding 
and OCB-I through guilt and shame (Hypotheses 7 to 9).  
Sample and Procedure 
We collected time-lagged data from a sample of employees working in Germany. An 
established data collection company (i.e., KeyFacts) invited 3,487 of their panelists to take part in 
our study. Participants were included if they were at least 18 years old and currently employed 
for at least 20 hours per week. We used online questionnaires across two waves with a time lag of 
two weeks in between. We choose two weeks as the optimal time lag because research has 
recently recommended the use of “shortitudinal” research designs (Dormann & Griffin, 2015), in 
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particular, when considering the potentially limited duration of emotions (Izard, 1989, 2009). To 
ensure the quality of the data, quality-screen-outs were implemented to remove speeders (i.e., 
participants who answered questions significantly faster than median completion time), and 
careless responders (i.e., participants, who failed to answer attention checks correctly). At Time 
1, 434 participants passed the implemented quality checks (response rate 12.5 %). Of these, 
63.4% completed the questionnaire at Time 2, resulting in a final sample size of 275. Participants 
worked on average 36.30 hours per week (SD = 6.66) in a broad array of industries ranging from 
private insurance to public health. Of the participants, 136 (49.5%) were female and 96 (34.9%) 
held a university degree. Participants’ age ranged from 19 to 65 years (M = 44.74, SD = 11.99). 
Measures 
Evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding. At Time 1, the three knowledge 
hiding types were measured with the three 4-item scales by Connelly et al. (2012). Participants 
indicated the extent to which they withheld relevant knowledge from their colleagues on a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). The items were introduced with: 
“In answering the following questions, please refer to a specific episode in the past two weeks as 
work in which a particular colleague requested knowledge from you and you declined. . .”, which 
was followed by the items. A sample item for evasive hiding is “Offered him/her some other 
information instead of what he/she really wanted” (Cronbach’s α = .88), a sample item for 
playing dumb is “Pretended that I did not know the information” (Cronbach’s α = .88), and a 
sample item for rationalized hiding is “Explained that the information is confidential and only 
available to people on a particular project” (Cronbach’s α = .81).  
Guilt. At Time 1, guilt was measured with the same items as in Study 1. We framed the 
items in the context of the reported knowledge hiding situation by using the following 
instructions: “Please think of the reported situation in which a specific colleague asked for your 
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knowledge and you did not comply with this inquiry. To which extent do the following emotions 
describe your feelings if you think back to this situation?”. Again, the scale yielded a high 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .88).  
Shame. At Time 1, shame was measured with the same items as in Study 1 and framed in 
the context of the knowledge hiding situation. The scale had a high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .92).  
Organizational citizenship behavior – individuals (OCB-I). At Time 2, OCB-I was 
measured with the seven-item scale from Williams and Anderson (1991). Participants indicated the 
extent to which they engaged in extra-role behaviors at work targeted at other employees on a seven-
point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). An example item is: “I go out of 
my way to help employees”. The scale showed a high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .92). 
Control variables. We controlled for participants’ age, gender and time pressure at Time 
1. Specifically, we included age because older workers tend to have higher generativity motives 
and are therefore more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors, such as mentoring and sense 
giving at work (Fasbender, Wang, Voltmer, & Deller, 2016; Gyekye & Haybatollahi, 2015). 
Furthermore, we controlled for gender (i.e., binary coded with 0 = male and 1 = female) because 
gender role stereotypes suggest that women possess more expressive behaviors, such as empathy 
and interpersonal orientation, which in turn leads to higher levels of organizational citizenship 
behavior (Chiaburu, Sawyer, Smith, Brown, & Harris, 2014; Fasbender, Wang, & Zhan, 2016). 
Finally, we included time pressure (3-item scale, Cronbach’s α = .78; Wu, Parker, & Jong, 2014) 
as control variable because we assumed that employees may use external time pressure as an 
excuse to rationalize their knowledge hiding, which could influence the extent to which they 
experience guilt and shame. In addition, the more time pressure people experience at work, the 
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less time they may be able to invest in helping and supporting others above their normal work 
duties (Eatough, Chang, Miloslavic, & Johnson, 2011).  
Construct Validity 
To ensure the construct validity of the six multi-item measures (i.e., evasive hiding, 
playing dumb, rationalized hiding, guilt, shame, and OCB-I) used in this study, we conducted a 
series of confirmatory factor analyses. Table 2 presents the fit indices for the measurement model 
and the alternative models. Results showed that the intended six-factor structure yielded a good 
model fit, and was superior to alternative models, such as the five-factor solution with guilt and 
shame loading on one common factor, the four-factor solution with evasive hiding, playing 
dumb, and rationalized hiding loading on one common factor, or the one-factor solution with all 
items loading on the same factor. Therefore, the construct validity of the measures was supported.  
***Please insert Table 2 about here*** 
Data Analysis 
 We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to investigate the direct and indirect 
relations between the three knowledge hiding types, guilt, shame, and OCB-I, using Mplus 7.31 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2015). Within the structural part of SEM, we used maximum likelihood 
(ML) estimation with bootstrapping (10,000 draws) to account for deviations from normality 
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  
Results 
Structural Equation Modeling 
  The fit of the partial mediation model was acceptable (χ2 (309) = 643.95, p < .01, CFI = 
.94, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .05), and significantly better (Δχ2 = 17.03, p < .01, Δdf = 3) than the fit 
of the full mediation model (χ2 (312) = 660.98, p < .01, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .06, SRMR = .08).  
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To investigate whether the estimated relationships are robust, we calculated our final 
partial mediation models with and without control variables. Results revealed that the estimated 
direct and indirect effects remained fairly stable and significant in the hypothesized direction 
even if we included control variables. Following the recommendations of Spector and Brannick 
(2011), we thus report our results without control variables. 
Hypotheses Tests 
Table 3 summarizes means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables in Study 
2. 
***Please insert Table 3 about here*** 
Hypotheses 2 to 6 addressed the direct relations among knowledge hiding, guilt, shame, 
and OCB-I. As can be seen in Figure 2 (showing the direct effects), evasive hiding was not 
significantly linked to guilt and shame, thus not supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b. For playing 
dumb, we found positive relations with guilt and shame, supporting Hypotheses 3a and 3b. In line 
with our assumption that rationalized hiding is not associated with guilt and shame, the structural 
coefficients suggested that rationalized hiding was not significantly related to guilt and shame. 
These findings provide support for Hypotheses 4a and 4b. 
***Please insert Figure 2 about here*** 
Furthermore, and in support of Hypotheses 5 and 6, we found a positive association 
between guilt and OCB-I, and a negative association between shame and OCB-I. 
**Please insert Table 4 about here*** 
Hypotheses 7 to 9 addressed the indirect relationship between the three types of knowledge 
hiding and OCB-I. Table 4 presents the indirect associations of evasive hiding, playing dumb, and 
rationalized hiding with OCB-I through guilt and shame with bootstrapped confidence intervals. We 
found no significant indirect relations for evasive hiding with OCB-I via guilt and shame, thus 
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not supporting Hypotheses 7a and 7b. For playing dumb, we found a positive indirect link with 
OCB-I via guilt, and a negative indirect link with OCB-I via shame, thus supporting Hypotheses 8a 
and 8b. Finally, no significant indirect association was found for rationalized hiding with OCB-I 
via guilt and shame, which is in line with Hypotheses 9a and 9b. 
Discussion 
 In this study, we examined the negative emotional consequences of knowledge hiding for 
knowledge hiding perpetrators and their subsequent relationship with positive organizational 
behavior. Specifically, we argued that knowledge hiding, in particular evasive hiding and playing 
dumb as the more deceptive knowledge hiding types (Connelly et al., 2012; Connelly & Zweig, 
2015), can elicit feelings of guilt and shame. Furthermore, based on theorizing in the moral 
emotion literature (Haidt, 2003; Tangney, 1991), we suggested that these self-conscious moral 
emotions trigger different emotion-based reparatory mechanisms (Ilies et al., 2013), namely an 
active compensation strategy for guilt (i.e., resulting in more OCB-I) and a passive withdrawal 
strategy for shame (i.e., resulting in less OCB-I). The findings from two studies provided support 
for most hypotheses. In Study 1, we used an experimental vignette methodology (Aguinis 
& Bradley, 2014) to establish that overall knowledge hiding was positively linked to feelings of 
guilt and shame. In Study 2, we conducted a two-wave field study of German employees and 
found that playing dumb but not evasive hiding elicited the proposed active compensation 
strategy via guilt and the passive withdrawal strategy via shame. As anticipated, rationalized 
hiding was unrelated to negative emotional consequences. 
Theoretical Implications 
Our findings have at least three theoretical implications. First, the exploration of an 
integrated behavior-emotion-behavior sequence contributes to the field’s understanding of the 
consequences of knowledge hiding for knowledge hiding perpetrators by adding an emotion 
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pathway. To date, the existing literature has mainly drawn from social exchange theory (Blau, 
1964) to argue that knowledge hiding leads to negative relational consequences because 
knowledge hiding perpetrators are perceived as less trustworthy and get subsequently excluded 
from information flows within organizations (Černe et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2012). Thus, the 
existing literature has relied on a relational mechanisms to explain consequences of knowledge 
hiding. However, this perspective has overlooked the relevant emotional consequences of 
knowledge hiding as a negative work behavior that deviates from established social norms (Ilies 
et al., 2013). Our findings point to the importance of capturing employees’ concrete emotional 
responses after a knowledge hiding incident to correctly infer whether negative or positive effects 
on subsequent work behavior are likely to occur. We thus take our findings as a starting point to 
suggest that moral emotions should be included in a comprehensive framework explaining the 
consequences of knowledge hiding. 
By focusing on the emotional consequences of knowledge hiding, our study also 
demonstrates that theoretical value can be added by shedding light on the double-edged nature of 
knowledge hiding. Whereas previous research has largely focused on the negative and 
performance-related consequences for the knowledge hiding perpetrator (Bogilović et al., 2017; 
Černe et al., 2014; Rhee & Choi, 2017), the proposed emotion pathway suggests that knowledge 
hiding can also elicit positive behaviors to compensate for one’s possible transgression of social 
norms within the organization. This counterintuitive perspective adds to initial findings in the 
knowledge hiding literature stating that knowledge hiding must not always possess detrimental 
organizational consequences (Connelly & Zweig, 2015). Our results can also be interpreted in the 
context of research on compensatory ethics (e.g., Gino & Margolis, 2011; Zhong, Ku, Lount, & 
Murnighan, 2010). The compensatory ethics perspective complements the well-established moral 
licensing effect (i.e., early ethical decisions trigger less ethical choices afterwards; Monin & 
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Miller, 2001; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009) by showing that individuals’ initial unethical 
decisions lead to more ethical choices afterwards. Participants’ compensatory activities are 
explained with their balancing efforts between fulfilling self-interests and upholding a positive 
moral image (Zhong et al., 2009). Likewise, our findings indicate that immoral, self-oriented 
behavior (i.e., knowledge hiding) can evoke moral, other-oriented behavior (i.e., OCB) through 
an emotion-based reparatory mechanism.  
Second, we contribute to a more fine-grained understanding of the knowledge hiding 
construct by examining the differential effects of its three types: evasive hiding, playing dumb, 
and rationalized hiding. Our findings indicated that playing dumb but not evasive hiding or 
rationalized hiding was driving the experience of guilt and shame, and the subsequent indirect 
associations with OCB-I. These findings support recent research that has suggested that the 
varying degree of deception inherent in evasive hiding, playing dumb, and rationalized hiding 
may be worthwhile to consider when examining knowledge hiding in organizations (Connelly 
& Zweig, 2015). However, in contrast to existing research that has positioned evasive hiding as 
the most deceptive form of knowledge hiding (Connelly & Zweig, 2015), in our sample, playing 
dumb was the type of knowledge hiding that elicited the strongest negative emotional reactions. 
We posit that not only the degree of deception associated with knowledge hiding types, but 
possibly also the fact that whether or not one provides knowledge at all to others upon request, 
might influence negative emotional experiences. Accordingly, evasive hiding means that 
employees provide at least some knowledge, even it is incorrect, misleading, or incomplete, while 
when playing dumb, employees pretend to be ignorant of the requested knowledge, thus not 
providing any knowledge upon request. Consequently, our findings may indicate that not only the 
degree of deception involved but also the extent to which one is providing knowledge at all might 
influence emotional consequences of knowledge hiding.  
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Third, zooming into the differential effects of guilt and shame, our results indicate that 
guilt motivates employees to repair their transgression through other-oriented behavior (i.e., 
OCB), whereas shame induces withdrawal from other-oriented behaviors. As such, this study 
establishes an emotional dual-process mechanism that is dependent on the type of self-conscious 
moral emotion. Our findings also contribute to the literature stating that other-oriented (i.e., guilt) 
and self-concerned (i.e., shame) emotions can co-occur and need to be captured simultaneously to 
be able to accurately predict subsequent behavioral strategies (Bohns & Flynn, 2013; Dreu & 
Nauta, 2009).  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 As with any research, our study is not without limitations. First, although our study 
investigates the emotional consequences of knowledge hiding in two Western industrialized 
countries (i.e., Germany and the United States), it is possible that moral emotions such as guilt 
and shame play out differently in non-Western cultures (e.g., Wallbott & Scherer, 1995; Wong & 
Tsai, 2007). For instance, a comparison of Dutch and Turkish/Moroccan individuals revealed that 
experiences of shame resulted in unique behavioral reactions: While Dutch individuals withdrew 
from the situation, Moroccan and Turkish individuals reacted with active verbal disapproval 
(Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). Thus, culture may serve as a 
boundary condition affecting individuals’ choice of an emotion-based reparatory strategy (i.e., 
compensation or withdrawal) as a reaction to the occurrence of guilt and shame.  
Second, we relied on self-report measures to test our hypotheses, which can potentially be 
affected by participants’ tendency to present themselves in a favorable light, in particular when 
they are asked to report on negative work behavior such as knowledge hiding. However, for a 
number of reasons we still consider our measurement approach appropriate. Self-report measures 
need to be used to assess knowledge hiding, because knowledge hiding is a concealed behavior 
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that is difficult to capture by other-report (Černe et al., 2014; Connelly et al., 2012). In addition, 
emotions refer to private perceptions that only the individual experiencing these emotions can 
assess (Conway & Lance, 2010), thus making it difficult to capture shame and guilt through 
objective measures. Furthermore, meta-analytical evidence has shown that other-reports of 
negative work behaviors provide only limited incremental variance over self-reports (Carpenter, 
Berry, & Houston, 2014). Notably, we also manipulated knowledge hiding in Study 1 and our 
manipulation check indicated that participants reacted to our framing, thus, providing evidence 
that we were able to capture the construct of interest. Nevertheless, future research should try to 
use behavioral manipulations of the independent variable and measures of the dependent variable. 
For instance, researchers could design laboratory experiments in which participants interact with 
others and their knowledge hiding behavior is experimentally manipulated (e.g., Bogilović et al., 
2017; Černe et al., 2014). Subsequently, participants’ positive behavior as a reaction to the 
knowledge hiding manipulation could be coded. 
Third, in Study 1, we used an experimental vignette methodology (Aguinis & Bradley, 
2014) and a crowdsourced sample to elicit emotional responses to a hypothetical knowledge 
hiding scenario. Although Mechanical Turk samples have been shown to deliver acceptable data 
quality for academic research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 
2013; Landers & Behrend, 2015), it must be acknowledged that there is an ongoing discussion 
about the validity of such samples. Even though some of the most common concerns (e.g., 
repeated participation, practice effects) might be less of a concern in an experimental design with 
random participant assignment, we still consider it useful to replicate our findings with a sample 
generated through other means. Furthermore, while the effectiveness of an experimental vignette 
methodology has been verified (Van Knippenberg & Van Knippenberg, 2005), especially in the 
context of norm violations and emotional responses (Belschak & Den Hartog, 2009; Ghorbani et 
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al., 2013; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Steiner, 2009), a valuable test of our model that could 
overcome concerns about participants’ ability to imagine how they would react in a hypothetical 
scenario would be to manipulate actual knowledge hiding behavior. We thus suggest that future 
research could follow up on our findings with experimental designs in which participants are 
instructed to hide their knowledge (see Černe et al., 2014), potentially even through differential 
manipulations of the different types of knowledge hiding.  
Fourth, while we were able to capture the proposed parallel mediation of guilt and shame 
in explaining the associations between the three types of knowledge hiding on OCB-I, we have to 
take note of the relatively high correlation between guilt and shame and the non-significant 
correlation of guilt and OCB-I displayed in Table 3. While the CFAs showed that guilt and shame 
can be separated empirically in line with our expectations, suppression effects might still have 
affected our results. Therefore, we also tested the effects of guilt and shame on OCB-I 
individually. Results showed that the estimated effects are slightly lower when tested individually 
(as compared to being tested simultaneously), but significant in the hypothesized direction. Thus, 
the effects of guilt and shame on OCB-I can be considered as fairly robust. Nonetheless, we 
encourage researchers to replicate our findings using different samples to further verify their 
robustness. In addition, another way to advance our findings would be to clarify whether the 
relationships between guilt and OCB-I are stronger when OCB-I is directed at the specific 
knowledge hiding target rather than non-specific others. Future research could test this 
assumption by collecting event-based data, in which knowledge hiding perpetrators report on the 
characteristics of specific knowledge hiding events.  
Going beyond the focus of this study, researchers could probe deeper into the boundary 
conditions that affect the link between knowledge hiding, emotional experiences, and subsequent 
compensatory work behavior. To that end, individual differences, such as attribution styles, might 
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influence the extent to which employees experience guilt and shame after hiding knowledge from 
their colleagues. According to attribution theory (Kelley, 1973; Kelley & Michela, 1980), 
individuals are inclined to assign causes to their actions and behavior. When making attributions, 
individuals differ in the extent to which they attribute causes of behavior internally (i.e., 
assigning the cause of behavior to an individual’s characteristics) or externally (i.e., assigning the 
cause of behavior to the situation the individual is in). The extent to which individuals attribute 
knowledge hiding internally or externally can affect subsequent experiences of guilt and shame 
(Sugathan, Ranjan, & Mulky, 2017; Tracy & Robins, 2006). To that end, individuals who 
attribute their knowledge hiding internally might experience guilt and shame more strongly 
compared to individuals who attribute the hiding of knowledge externally. As a consequence, 
their subsequent compensatory behavior should be more pronounced than the compensatory acts 
of employees who tend to attribute their knowledge hiding to external circumstances.     
In addition, relational and contextual factors could also have an effect on the degree to 
which employees’ knowledge hiding elicits feelings of guilt and shame. With regard to relational 
factors, psychological proximity to the targets of knowledge hiding (Ghorbani et al., 2013) may 
influence the strength of knowledge hiding perpetrators’ emotional reactions in terms of guilt 
and shame. Accordingly, the closer knowledge hiding perpetrators feel to the knowledge hiding 
target, the stronger their negative emotional reactions may be. Contextual factors refer to a set 
of external cues from which organizational members deduce what their attitudes and behavior 
should be (Bohns & Flynn, 2013; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). For example, contextual factors that 
increase employees’ awareness about their moral wrongdoing, such as ethical climates (Victor & 
Cullen, 1988), corporate ethical codes (Stevens, 2008), and ethical supervisors (Brown & Treviño, 
2006; Treviño, Brown, & Hartman, 2016), may strengthen the link between knowledge hiding and 
self-conscious moral emotions. In contrast, when employees work in organizations where they 
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experience injustice or a climate of mistrust, they may feel more eligible to engage in negative 
work behaviors such as knowledge hiding to get even for their mistreatment (Ilies et al., 2013; 
Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006). Future research needs to test this assumption to clarify how relational 
and contextual factors shape the link between knowledge hiding and emotional experiences. 
Lastly, future research may want to focus in more detail on evasive hiding that did not elicit 
significant effects in our study, although it is considered as a deceptive type of knowledge hiding 
(Connelly et al., 2012). We used the original measure (Connelly et al., 2012) that does not 
differentiate whether knowledge hiding perpetrators provide incorrect or misleading/incomplete 
information. However, individuals who share wrong information should experience much higher 
levels of guilt and shame than individuals who provide correct but misleading or incomplete 
information. In the latter case, individuals can still rationalize that shared at least some 
knowledge, thus reducing the likelihood of experiencing guilt and shame. Scholars may want to 
develop a measure that provides a more fine-grained differentiation between these aspects of 
evasive hiding.  
Practical Implications 
Our findings offer several relevant suggestions for practitioners. First and foremost, 
managers should educate employees about the negative emotional consequences of knowledge 
hiding. Employees need to be made aware that the potentially expected benefits of knowledge 
hiding, for example, in terms of being the exclusive owner of specific knowledge, might be 
outweighed by the emotional costs associated with knowledge hiding. Second, we suggest that 
managers should communicate the negative organizational consequences of knowledge hiding 
more clearly. Making the negative consequences more salient, could motivate employees who 
engaged in knowledge hiding to make up for their transgressions through compensatory 
behavior. Furthermore, managers may also want to clarify that withdrawal based on feelings of 
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shame can intensify the negative consequences of knowledge hiding. Third, managers should 
try to elicit constructive negative emotions (guilt) rather than destructive ones (shame) in their 
employees to facilitate positive compensatory work behavior as a reaction to hiding knowledge. 
Managers could emphasize that knowledge hiding might be unavoidable at times (e.g., due to 
time pressure, other-interest), but that employees could then compensate for their transgression 
of social norms through subsequent compensatory work behavior, such as OCB. Furthermore, 
to minimize shame and maximize guilt, managers should encourage employees to interpret their 
knowledge hiding as a behavioral (“My actions were bad”) rather than a self-centered (“I am a 
bad person”) transgression of social norms. Accordingly, managers need to emphasize 
employees’ control over the consequences of their knowledge hiding behavior, and point out how 
employees can make up for their transgressions. In contrast, managers should refrain from 
making generalized assessments about the moral identity of employees who engaged in 
knowledge hiding. Lastly, on a more general level, managers are well advised to create an 
environment in which employees know that they are acknowledged for who they are. An 
organizational climate may contribute to employees’ feelings of self-worth, and reduce their 
tendency to question their selves and attribute failures to their moral deficiency. Consequently, 
employees might be less likely to experience shame and more likely to experience guilt as a 
result of hiding their knowledge, which could increase the likelihood that they engage in positive 
compensatory work behavior in the future.   
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Study 1 Variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 
1   Guilt 2.90 1.94 -    
2   Shame 2.33 1.56 .72** -   
3   Knowledge hiding conditiona 1.48 0.50 .74** .55** -  
4   Manipulation check 3.85 2.64 .79** .62** .90** - 
Note. N = 137. a = knowledge hiding condition with 1 = no knowledge hiding and 2 = knowledge 
hiding.  
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Table 2 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Fit Indices for Measurement Model for Study 2 
Note. N = 275. Difference of chi-square values (Δχ2) were estimated to compare to the six-factor 
model. a = guilt and shame loading on one factor, b = evasive hiding, playing dumb, and 
rationalized hiding loading on one factor. CFI = Confirmatory Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation, SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual. 
* p < .05, **p < .01. 
Model  χ2 df Δχ2 (Δdf) CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Six-factor model 643.95 309 - 0.94 0.06 0.05 
Five-factor modela 879.86 314 235.91 (5)** 0.81 0.08 0.06 
Four-factor modelb 1061.60 318 417.65 (9)** 0.92 0.09 0.06 
One-factor model  3,635.75 324 2,991.80 (15)** 0.37 0.19 0.19 
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Table 3 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Study 2 Variables 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1   Age 44.74 11.99 -         
2   Gendera 0.50 0.50      -.12† -        
3   Time pressure 3.86 1.39      -.07  -.03 -       
4   Evasive hiding 2.47 1.31     -.16**  -.21**   .18** -      
5   Playing dumb 2.68 1.36     -.17**  -.11†   .05   .63** -     
6   Rationalized hiding 2.81 1.35     -.08   .04  -.03   .50** .52** -    
7   Guilt 2.95 1.40       .03   .04   .13*   .22** .26**  .16** -   
8   Shame 2.37 1.22      -.12*   .10   .04   .27** .37**  .22**  .66** -  
9   OCB-I 5.22 1.05       .14*   .03   .04  -.20** -.26* -.17**   .05 -.12† - 
Note. N = 275. a = binary coded with 0 = male and 1 = female. OCB-I = organizational 
citizenship behavior – individuals. 
† p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.  
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Table 4 
Indirect Relationships of Evasive Hiding, Playing Dumb, and Rationalized Hiding with 
Organizational Citizenship Behavior – Individuals via Guilt and Shame with Bootstrapped 
Confidence Intervals in Study 2 
Note. N = 275. SE = standard error, CI LL = lower level of 95% confidence interval, CI UL = 
upper level of 95% confidence interval. 
  
 Organizational Citizenship Behavior – Individuals  
Indirect effects Estimate SE CI LL CI UL 
Evasive hiding via     
Guilt  .03 0.04 -.02 .13 
Shame  -.00 0.03 -.06 .05 
Playing dumb via     
Guilt   .08 0.04 .02 .19 
Shame  -.12 0.06 -.25 -.03 
Rationalized hiding via     
Guilt  -.01 0.03 -.06 .06 
Shame  .00 0.02 -.04 .06 
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Figure 2. Results of Study 2: Structural Equation Modeling Showing the Associations of Evasive 
Hiding, Playing Dumb, and Rationalized Hiding and Organizational Citizenship Behavior – 
Individuals (OCB-I) through Guilt and Shame 
† p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01.  
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